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RELIGIOUS CLAIMS AND THE DYNAMICS OF
ARGUMENT
M. Cathleen Kaveny"

This Article investigates the questions whether and when religious claims may enter into public debate about importantpolitical issues by considering the purposes of argument in the
public square. These purposes include: (1) argument as selfdisclosure; (2) argument as persuasion; and (3) argument as
bulwark againstengagement with the ideas of others. The Article argues that restrictionson the use of religious claims in
public deliberationsand discussion impede the legitimate functions of public argument as self-disclosing and persuasive activities. In contrast, such restrictionscontribute to the use of
argument as bulwark, which is arguably destructive to public
deliberationin a pluralisticsociety.

For many of us living educated, middle and upper-class lives in
the United States at the end of the twentieth century, the problem is
not that we belong to no community whose values and commitments
give meaning and structure to our days. It is rather that we seem to
belong to too many communities, each vying for our attention and
competing for our loyalty. We belong to religious groups, whose sacred texts and rituals instruct and sustain our views about the ultimate meaning and purpose of human life. At the same time, we are
citizens of a highly pluralistic democratic republic, prohibited by its
Constitution from taking a stand upon the merits of such views. We
are family members, professionals, and participants in a wide variety of voluntary organizations ranging from Alcoholics Anonymous
to the National Rifle Association.
At times, we have all found it difficult to convince persons with
whom we share one facet of our lives of the merit of a conviction or
an obligation arising from another sphere. We may be bound by ties
of blood or marriage to persons who do not share our religious beliefs; we may have co-religionists who cannot understand what it
means for us to honor our professional obligations; we may work

* M. Cathleen Kaveny is an associate professor at Notre Dame Law
School, with a current appointment in the Department of Theology.
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with people who wonder why we cannot in good conscience perform
certain actions desired by our clients and permitted by the laws of
our government. In such circumstances, it is tempting to operate
with a set of compartmentalized selves, each with its distinct
framework of values, that may be brought sequentially to bear as we
move from one sphere of our lives to another. It is all too easy to ignore the vexing questions of how and whether we may draw upon
the language and commitments intrinsic to one of the groups to
which we belong in dealing with the problems facing another group.
How and when should believers use their religious beliefs in
thinking or talking about matters of public concern? How, in other
words, do we negotiate the differing vocabularies and commitments
of the various communities to which we belong when considering a
matter of importance to all of them? Did Abraham Lincoln and
Martin Luther King, Jr. act appropriately when they invoked Christian religious considerations to support emancipation and civil
rights?
Do those whose opposition to legalized abortion or the death
penalty is rooted in the conviction that every member of the human
family bears the image and likeness of God act appropriately when
they cast their ballots accordingly? What about when they draw
upon such images or arguments organized around them in their attempts to convince their fellow citizens to do likewise? Does it matter if their fellow citizens are also fellow believers, and the conversation is taking place in the parish hall? Does it matter if that
conversation includes many of the same people, but the location is
now the town hall? Are the anti-death penalty activists' attempts at
political advocacy more justifiable if they cast their opposition to
such practices in the language of Humean sympathy, Kantian deontology, or Millian utilitarianism rather than in theological terms?
These questions have generated great interest among both
scholars of political theory and legal scholars focusing on the relationship of religion and law in a constitutional democracy such as
the United States. Even those scholars who explicitly recognize the
contributions that religious belief can make to the broader culture
have expressed a deep wariness of encouraging free appeal to religious warrants in the public debate about the political structure of
society, particularly the debate pertaining to the scope of its constitutional guarantees and the framework of its coercive laws. For example, both Kent Greenawalt and John Rawls have taken pains to
emphasize the broad role that religious belief (and other comprehensive worldviews) can play in broader cultural discussions about the
nature of civil society.1

1.

KENT GREENAWALT, PRIVATE CONSCIENCES AND PUBLIC REASONS 152

(1995); John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 765,
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Nonetheless, both Greenawalt (in Religious Convictions and Political Choice) and Rawls (in PoliticalLiberalism)have emphasized
that in the vast majority of conversations affecting the basic political
structure of society, citizens should put forward their arguments in
generally acceptable terms, not in terms that are rooted in specific
traditions of belief.2 While both theorists recognize that their crite768 (1997).
2. In his 1997 University of Chicago Law Review article, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, John Rawls appears to have altered the views he takes in
POLITICAL LIBERALISM in several ways. JOHN RAWlS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM
(1993). In my view, the most significant differences are the following- (1) In Political Liberalism,it generally appears as if there is one political conception of
justice, which is supported by an overlapping consensus of comprehensive
worldviews (although Rawls does not demand agreement "down to the last details of the principles defining its content," RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALIS.,., at
226, and at other points speaks of "a class of liberal conceptions that vary
within a certain more or less narrow range," id. at 164). In contrast, in The
Idea of Public Reason Revisited, he speaks more definitively of"a family of political conceptions of justice," each of which is generated by a reasonable comprehensive worldview. Rawls, supranote 1, at 773 (emphasis added). (2) In Political Liberalism, the notion of the overlapping consensus plays a very
prominent role, since it generates the content of the political conception of justice. RAwLs, POLITICAL LBERALISM, at 134. Moreover, it appears as if the
overlapping consensus of comprehensive doctrines can be determined empirically or by sociological study, the content of the consensus in a political context
depends heavily on what comprehensive doctrines happen to hold sway in that
context. In The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, the contribution of the overlapping consensus is diminished, since every reasonable comprehensive doctrine is permitted (a) to generate its own reasonable political conception of justice and (b) to present itself fully in the public square, as long as it is willing at
some point to explain how its positions are supported by a reasonable political
conception of justice. Rawls, supra note 1, at 784. However, in the article, the
role of the notion of "reasonable" as a limitation on comprehensive doctrines approved for admission to the public discourse is correspondingly increased. Id.
Since proponents of comprehensive doctrines can present their unfiltered conceptions of justice in the public square and rely on them in their own deliberations about fundamental issues of justice, it is particularly important in Rawls'
revised schema that they be reasonable. (3) Most importantly for this essay,
Rawls revises the circumstances in which full-blown comprehensive worldviews
can be presented in the public square on fundamental political matters. Id. As
stated below in the text, in PoliticalLiberalism, Rawls contemplates the introduction of elements of comprehensive worldviews not entailed by the political
conception of justice only in exceptional circumstances. RAM;S, POLITICAL
LIBERALISM, at 247. In the article, adherents are free to introduce all elements
of their comprehensive worldviews into the public square, subject to the proviso
that "in due course proper political reasons-and not reasons given solely by
comprehensive doctrines-are presented that are sufficient to support whatever
the comprehensive doctrines introduced are said to support." Rawls, supra note
1, at 784. In his own terminology, in PoliticalLiberalism, Rawls writes of the
"inclusive view" of public reason, that allows comprehensive worldviews into the
discussion when necessary to "strengthen the ideal of public reason itself."
BAWLs, POLrICAL LIBERALISM, at 247. In contrast, in the article he speaks of
the "wide view" of public reason, which allows comprehensive worldviews into
the discussion subject to the "proviso." Rawls, supra note 1, at 783-84.
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ria for public argument cannot be imposed by law, they nonetheless
maintain that ideal citizens will honor and abide by them. In Religious Convictions and PoliticalChoice, Greenawalt holds that in most
cases, citizens should not make arguments based upon their own religious beliefs in the process of persuading others to accept their position on such matters of public import, despite the fact that they
themselves may be justified in holding the position for religious reasons.3 "Though reliance on religious convictions may be appropriate
in these settings [dealing with controversial political issues], argument in religious terms is often an inapt form of public dialogue."
In PoliticalLiberalism, John Rawls argues that when engaging in
public discourse about fundamental political questions (i.e., those
involving constitutional essentials and questions of basic justice),
citizens must restrain themselves in two ways." First, with respect
to substantive questions of justice, they must not appeal to comprehensive religious or philosophical doctrines, but to a political conception of justice that is intelligible and defensible apart from any particular comprehensive doctrine.6 Second, with respect to the method
of inquiry regarding constitutional essentials and basic justice, they
are to appeal only to "presently accepted general beliefs and forms of
reasoning found in common sense, and the methods and conclusions
of science when these are not controversial." 7
Thus both Greenawalt and Rawls (in PoliticalLiberalism) contemplate that in the vast majority of circumstances, political discussion should take place in terms that do not depend on any particular
religious or other comprehensive worldview. Nonetheless, both contemplate that there may be exceptional circumstances where this
may not be the case, which are triggered by the failure of public reason. In his first book on this topic, Greenawalt argues that it is impossible and unfair to expect believers to leave aside their distinctive religious premises in their own deliberations about many of the
most controversial issues of political society, including borderline
questions status (e.g., the status of fetuses and animals), the relative weight of competing moral standards and objectives, and complex factual judgments (e.g., welfare assistance, punishment, and
military policy).8 Greenawalt does not explicitly authorize believers
3. KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND POLITICAL CHOICE 12
(1988) [hereinafter GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS].

4. Id.
5. RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 2, at 224.

6. Id. at 226. It is, however, supported by an overlapping consensus of
reasonable comprehensive doctrines, each of which endorses the political conception from its own point of view. Id. at 134.
7. Id. at 224.
8. See generally GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS, supra note 3, at
chs. 6-9. In his second book, he clarifies that the use of comprehensive worldviews in deliberation is not limited to these difficult cases. He writes that
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to refer to their distinctive premises in public political discussion
even in such cases.' However, it would be impossible for him not to
expect that they would do so under such circumstances, because of
the undeniable importance of these questions to the structure of our
political life itself. In PoliticalLiberalism, Rawls would also accept
the introduction of distinctive elements of comprehensive worldview
in circumstances in which their adherents "do so in ways that
0 He gives two examstrengthen the ideal of public reason itself.""
ples that might arise in more or less well-ordered society such as our
own: first, there can be circumstances in which participants in a
heated debate (e.g., regarding governmental aid to parochial
schools) introduce their comprehensive worldviews in order to demonstrate to each other their good-faith commitment to fundamental
political values." Second, a society may be struggling with "profound division over constitutional essentials," such as arose with respect to abolition and slavery. 2 In these circumstances, the introduction of comprehensive worldviews can underline the importance
of the matter at stake and contribute to their proper resolution.
"comprehensive views and nonaccessible grounds can appropriately figure in
resolution of the broad range of political issues that ordinary citizens face." Id.
at 160. Nevertheless, in my view, he does not greatly expand the role of distinc-

tively religious warrants in public discussion. It is true that he would not place
limitations on the use of religious discourse by ordinary citizens in advocating
political positions-not because they have a positive moral right to support
their positions in those terms, but because no one is likely to care much about
their reasoning process.

Except within small communities, [ordinary citizens] cannot expect
that legislators will personally read their letters, or that anyone will
engage thoughtfully with the ideas expressed. For this reason, citizens need not worry much about how they express themselves, so long

as the grounds leading to their decisions are consistent with basic
premises of liberal democracy that they accept.
Id.
Once a citizen does have significant influence, Greenawalt asks them to

observe the restraints of public reason. He calls these influential members of
the community "quasi-public citizens"; they are those who "consistently engage
in analysis and advocacy of positions on political issues" such as media commentators, editors, presidents of large corporations, and some law professors.
Id. According to Greenawalt, "they appropriately state grounds for positions
that lie in public reason when they address the entire public on particular political issues." Id. Significantly, when ordinary citizens engage in broader
public advocacy, he asks them to obey the norms of public reason, although he
recognizes that it is not as important in their case as in that of quasi-public citizens. It is important to note that despite the fact that he considers them quasi-

public citizens as well, Greenawalt explicitly exempts religious leaders from
this standard of behavior. He addresses their situation in a separate chapter.
9. See generally GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS, supra note 3, at
chs. 6-9.
10. RAwLs, POLITICAL LBERALISM, supranote 2, at 247.
11. Id. at 248.

12. Id.
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Needless to say, the positions advocated by Rawls or Greenawalt can be questioned on a number of fronts. For example,
what makes an argument religious-or indebted to a comprehensive
religious or philosophical scheme-rather than appropriately public
for the purposes of this debate on the political conception of justice?
Is it the actual structure of the argument? Is it the argument's presuppositions? Is it the argument's historical roots? Moreover, how
is the definition of "religious" or other distinctively controversial
worldviews for purpose of their limitation in public discussion related to the purpose of that limitation? For example, in denying a
constitutional right to assisted suicide, the Supreme Court appealed
to the historical practices of our country, which demonstrates strong
disapproval of taking one's own life. 3 By itself, appeals to history
are not religiously-based arguments. But what of the fact that the
history describes a prohibition generated in a time where religion
and politics were far more radically intertwined, and which almost
certainly was originally motivated by religious concerns? If one
point of limiting political discussion to public reasons is to insure
civic peace, then is it not likely that the source of the argument in a
distinctively religious claim will generate resentment among nonbelievers who continue to be bound by its force?
While these and other questions merit exploration, I shall not
attempt to deal with them here. Instead, I shall focus on what I
take to be a far more striking problem of the current discussion of
religious arguments in the public square-namely, the fact that it
has generally proceeded without paying careful enough attention to
the actual subject matter at hand: argument. What are people actually doing when they make arguments to one another? What goals
are they trying to accomplish? How does the structure of the argument advance or impede their goals? Curiously enough, many theorists of public reason fail to address these fundamental questions
relating to the nature and purpose of political argument. Instead,
they develop their approaches on the basis of a concept of argumentation that is rather abstract and purposeless; it reflects the timbre
of the seminar room rather than the political meeting hall. In the
academy, after all, often there is no purpose beyond the argument
itself; a good argument or discussion is its own telos. In the broader
political community, however, an argument has a more practical
character; it is a means to an end. As lawyers know very well, it is a
tool that is used to accomplish the objectives of the one making the
argument.
Consequently, in this Paper I would like to look at the question
of what role religiously based arguments in the public square should
play from a different angle; focusing not on the meaning of religion,

13.

Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
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or the nature of the political community, but on the purpose of argument." It is my hope that careful attention to the actual function
and use of argumentation to persuade others of a particular viewpoint may yield a more nuanced understanding of how religious
warrants should be used by believing individuals when arguing in
their capacity as citizens. What, then, are the reasons that two or
more individuals might enter into a discussion about fundamental
and controversial issues of public morality, such as universal health
care, physician assisted suicide, or abortion? I believe that there are
at least three distinct purposes that could motivate such a discussion that can be summarized as follows: (1) argument as mutual
self-disclosure; (2) argument as persuasive tool; and (3) argument as
bulwark. They are explored in more detail below.
I.
ARGUMiENT AS MUTUAL SELF-DISCLOSURE
If we enter into a frank discussion about whether physicianassisted suicide should be legally permissible, we embark upon a
process that will allow our conversation partners to learn a great
deal about us. In making our arguments, we will give strong clues
as to what we believe to be the "worth" or "value" of human life and
the proper deference due to individual choice. In the conversation,
we will probably disclose whether we believe the process of suffering
and dying has any intrinsic meaning. In evaluating the likelihood
that patients will experience pressure to choose death from physicians or family members, we will reveal something of our basic
views about the goodness or evil at the heart of human nature. The
process of self-disclosure inevitably entails risk. We may have difficulty expressing how our primary conceptual framework can illuminate a particular issue; we may find ourselves unable to give persuasive answers to the questions posed by an audience to whom that
framework is largely alien. Those engaging in argument as selfdisclosure can find the process distressing and threatening in at
least two ways. First, our inability to articulate our deeply held positions in a powerful manner may make us feel as if we have in some
way failed the community that has nourished and protected them.
Second, we may find ourselves facing a skeptical or even hostile response from our conversation partners. If we also stand in some
type of communal relation with them, such a response may tear at
our self-identity, making us feel as if various pieces of ourselves are
at war with one another.
Consequently, if we are members of two or more communities, it
is often safer to couch our arguments in the language predominant

14. See MICHAEL J. PERRY, LOvE & POWER, THE ROLE OF RELIGION AND
MORALITY IN AMERICAN POLITICS, 44-47 (1991) (analyzing the purposes of argument in the public square).
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in the group to whom we are speaking, even if our own primary
ways of thinking about the question are more indebted to another
group to which we belong. For example, when discussing controversial issues in the company of fellow physicians, it may be easier for a
Christian doctor to speak the language of beneficence, nonmaleficence, autonomy, and justice 5 rather than to invoke the corporal works of mercy. Similarly, when asked to speak to a convention of insurance executives, a physician morally at home in the language of secular bioethics may present his or her position in the
language of cost-benefit analysis and medical loss ratios.
Many of us who belong to two or more communities have become adept at translating positions held on grounds indebted to the
conceptual framework of one community into language more familiar to the other. Yet, if we have led our conversation partners to believe that we are providing them with our real reasons for holding a
given position, this process of translation may undermine a fundamental purpose of argument as self-disclosure. In fact, under some
circumstances, it may be outright deceptive. By engaging in the
process of translation, we may find ourselves mounting an argument
for a position without at all disclosing our real reasons for holding it.
The very fact that we have entered into an ostensibly frank discussion on a given issue strongly implies that if the arguments we put
forth are refuted, there is at least some possibility that we will
change our minds. But that may not be the case. Very often, we
will simply search for a more effective translation. If our conversation partners are also engaging in this process of translation before
putting forward their own views on a contested issue, we may end
up with a situation of mutual deception rather than mutual selfdisclosure.
Does this conception of argument as self-disclosure have any
implications for how we should understand the role of religious belief in conversations about the public good? I believe that it does. In
Religion in Public Life: A Dilemma for Democracy, Ronald Thiemann argues that there are three norms that participants in conversations about the public realm should strive to meet: public accessibility, mutual respect among citizens who differ about matters of
public import, and moral integrity in the way that we hold and advance our own positions on such matters. Thieman draws heavily
on the ideas of Greenawalt and Rawls's Political Liberalism in developing his own position. Nonetheless, I will argue that if his norm
of public accessibility is interpreted in ways that too closely track
15. These categories are taken from one of the most well-known and wellrespected texts in medical ethics, ToM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS,
PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS (4th ed. 1994).
16. RONALD THIEMANN,
MOCRACY 135-41 (1996).

RELIGION IN PUBLIC LIFE: A DILEMMA FOR DE-
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their approaches to this question (as described above), then it may
impede the implementation of his norms of mutual respect and
moral integrity.
According to Thiemann, the norm of mutual respect is a necessary extension of Madison's norm of mutual tolerance. 7 Mutual respect goes beyond tolerance in that it directs citizens to "grant to
those with whom they disagree the same consideration that they
themselves would hope to receive.""8 He suggests that in effect, it is
the Golden Rule standard applied to argumentative interchange."
For Thiemann, "[c]itizens who manifest the virtue of mutual respect
acknowledge the moral agency of those with whom they disagree
and thereby treat their arguments as grounded not simply in personal preference or self-interest but in genuine moral conviction.""
The hallmark of mutual respect is the ability to acknowledge the
moral force of an argument with which one disagrees; its goal is to
ensure that citizens remain open to persuasion.
How is mutual respect best fostered? By encouraging citizens to
translate their viewpoints into the generally accessible language of
the public square, or by facilitating their willingness to embark
upon the hard work of explaining their judgments about matters of
public concern in the terms that they actually believe to justify those
judgments? I believe that the latter course is the better one. In order to understand why, we need to distinguish between two concepts
of respect. First, there is a "basic" notion of respect, in which we
honor persons for being autonomous agents, or children of God, etc.
"Basic respect" should be accorded to everyone in a democratic republic, no matter what positions they hold or their warrants for
holding them. Second, there is a "thick" conception of respect, which
honors the integrity and virtue of others, despite the fact that their
primary moral commitments are significantly different from one's
own. This type of respect, which is what I believe Thiemann is concerned with, cannot be a right. It must be earned. What, concretely,
does the process of granting or denying "thick" respect entail?
At the very least, before we decide to accord someone "thick" respect, we need to attempt to view the moral universe from her perspective. We need to understand how her views on various positions
hang together, as well as the ideals and fears that animate such
views. Before we grant that respect, we must see that it is possible
to live a morally coherent life within the framework she has
adopted. Furthermore, we must find some significant aspect of it
which is worthy of admiration. Sometimes that may take a little

17. Id. at 136-37.

18. Id- at 136.
19. See id.
20. Id.
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perseverance. For example, in a hypothetical conversation with an
enthusiastic citizen of a society modeled on ancient Sparta, we may
discover that something in her notion of honor resonates with our
own moral commitments, despite the fact that we do not place the
same weight on that virtue, or interpret it in precisely the same
way. Thus the process of granting "thick" respect requires that we
not only allow, but encourage each other to make our respective positions intelligible within the moral framework from which they take
their strength. In contrast, if we require each other to translate our
positions into the language of public reason, the coherence and
power that should command our respect may be lost in the translation.21
The conception of "thick" respect just described is intimately
connected with moral integrity, which is Thiemann's third and final
norm for public discourse." He contends that moral integrity has
three fundamental components. 3 It is demonstrated in consistency
of speech, so that we do not maintain one position before one audience and take another position before a different audience. 24 It is
also manifest in consistency between speech and action, so that we do
not simply give lip service to our moral convictions, but act upon
them in an appropriate manner.2 5 Finally, moral integrity can be
seen in integrity ofprinciple, which leads us to apply the same moral
principles across the whole range of cases to which they apply, not
only to the cases which appeal to us.'
How do we judge whether our fellow citizens hold particular
views regarding issues of public import with moral integrity? How
do they make similar judgments about us? We are all likely to have
a solid basis for making such an evaluation only if we help each
other understand the real reasons for our actions. If we put too
much pressure on our conversation partners to translate their deepest moral commitments into another moral language, then the integrity of their positions may be hidden from view. For example,
when Judge John Noonan's views are abstracted from their home in
Catholic social teaching and mapped onto the dichotomous "liberal
versus conservative" worldview favored by the American media, his
concern for well-being of the vulnerable terminally-ill may appear to
21. Rawls writes: "Citizens realize that they cannot reach agreement or

even approach mutual understanding on the basis of their irreconcilable comprehensive doctrines." Rawls, supra note 1, at 766. It is not clear to me why
this is the case, nor why presenting a public face of a distinctive public conception of justice rooted in a comprehensive doctrine is likely to facilitate mutual
understanding.
22. THIEMANN, supra note 16, at 137.

23.
24.
25.
26.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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rest uneasily with his antipathy toward harsh immigration laws and
an expansive use of the death penalty." To appreciate Judge
Noonan's moral integrity-which encompasses his judicial integrity-one has to take the time and effort to enter into the framework
that supports it. Thus, Thiemann's norm of moral integrity, no less
than his norm of mutual respect, may be in some tension with the
norm of public accessibility.
Two particularly difficult issues remain. First, in his University
of Chicago Law Review article, Rawls explicitly allows that adherents of reasonable comprehensive worldviews may enter the debate
about fundamental political issues, provided that they in due course
show how their position is justified by their "political conception of
justice."28 He also acknowledges that persons may seek to speak in
the public square not in order to engage in argument about political
matters, but to demonstrate how their worldviews support public
reason. Rawls's position in this article raises an important issue
for my own argument: Is the fact that one's comprehensive worldview is "reasonable" either necessary or sufficient to gain "thick" respect on my terms? In my view, Rawlsian reasonableness is neither
necessary nor sufficient for "thick" respect. More specifically, I believe that we can find a "reasonable" worldview so impoverished and
incoherent, or implausible in its basic assumptions about the nature
and purpose of human life, that we find very little to admire about
its adherents, despite the fact that we do not consider them to be
political threats. Conversely, we can find much to admire about,
and to learn from, a worldview that does not accept the Rawlsian
constraints on public discussion. Being a member of a pluralistic society is complicated; the normative judgments that we make about
one another admit of no easy algorithm.
Second, can the fact that an individual advocates a particular
position on a given issue of morality or public policy suffice in and of
itself to render him or her ineligible for "thick" respect."' It is diffi-

27. Ronald Dworkin, Politics, Death, and Nature, 6 HEALTH MATRIX 201,
211 (1996).
28. Rawls, supranote 1, at 776.
29. Id. at 786.
30. Needless to say, the answer to this question will depend in part upon

how broadly or narrowly one defines the position at stake. If a position is defined very broadly, to include one's reasons for holding it, we are more likely to

be able to say that it precludes the possibility of thick respect in and of itself.
For example, it is not difficult to conclude that the person who holds the following position does not deserve "thick" respect: "We should drastically curtail
immigration to the United States because we are a superior people whose
strength will be diluted if we allow inferior people from other nations to live
among us." In contrast, it is more difficult to say that someone who holds a position described as "the United States should drastically curtail immigration" is

per se ineligible for "thick" respect. Morally respectable reasons may support

434
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cult to preclude an affirmative answer to this question in extreme
cases, such as a person who advocates a repeal of the Thirteenth,
Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments in order to reinstate the enslavement of African-Americans. Developing appropriate criteria to
identify such cases will be extremely difficult. Nonetheless, it is
clear that this sort of per se disqualification from eligibility for respect happens more frequently than necessary in contemporary discussions of controversial issues. How then should we combat it?
From a practical perspective, to adopt Rawls's and Greenawalt's
views about when arguments grounded in particular religious or
moral traditions may properly be introduced into the public square
may be exactly the wrong approach.
Generally speaking, Rawls (in Political Liberalism) and Greenawalt suggest that religious considerations may be inserted into
the public discussion only with respect to highly controversial political issues that cannot be settled solely on the basis of public reason.31 Yet the foregoing discussion of argument as self-revelation
suggests that this may be the least productive time to introduce arguments not accessible to all participants in the debate.
For those who seek a liberal society that embraces rather than
transcends pluralism, the best use of religiously based arguments
may be to show how they support basic, widely shared commitments
of our society. Suppose that adherents of particular moral world
views make vigorous use of argument as self-disclosure in the public
square. They attempt to explain forthrightly to their fellow citizens
how their particular convictions support deeply embedded ideals
such as the equality of all human beings, the dignity of work, etc. It
is at least possible that such efforts may foster the development of
mutual respect in a "thick" sense. We are all more disposed to listen
to arguments that support positions with which we agree, even if
those arguments make use of premises that seem alien to us. As a
consequence, we may develop a more complete understanding of our
fellow citizens, thereby finding it easier to recognize their moral integrity. Furthermore, if we make a practice of defending our common practices from the perspective of our differing world views, it
will be easier to contextualize the issues on which we do disagree.
Under such circumstances, there might be less risk that particular
religious traditions will be perceived as mysterious forces ineluctably linked with one side or another in neuralgic social debates in our
increasingly pluralistic society.

this position, such as a belief that we have a prior obligation to take care of the
poor and suffering persons already living among us.
31. GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS, supra note 3, at 7; RAWLS,
POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supranote 2, at 9-10.
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II. ARGUMENT AS A TOOL OF PERSUASION
The second aspect of argument that I want to consider is its use
as a tool of persuasion. This function, of course, is the most commonly associated with argument; generally speaking, we argue in
order to persuade someone else to believe or to act in a particular
way. But how exactly does argument work for this purpose? More
specifically, what do we mean by persuasion, why is it important,
and to whom should it be addressed?
First, it is crucial to keep in mind that "persuasion" is an intentional activity, engaged in by the persuader in order to achieve a
concrete purpose in a concrete situation. For example, suppose we
are citizen-activists who want to pass a referendum on health care
reform at the state elections. What, exactly, would be the goals of
our efforts to use argument as a persuasive tool? Depending upon
the nature and degree of our commitment, we could desire to
achieve any one of the following three goals:
(1) Get our conversation partners to vote for, rather than
against, the referendum come election day;
(2) Get our conversation partners to vote for the referendum because they believe that the health care reform proposal embodied in
it is a good idea;
(3) Get our conversation partners to vote for, rather than
against, the referendum because they believe that it is a good idea
for the same reasons that we believe it is a good idea.
Now, the tactics that we will employ in my efforts at persuasion
will very much depend upon which of the foregoing goals we adopt.
For example, if our aim is simply to elicit support for the referendum in any way that we can, we may introduce considerations that
are extrinsic to the debate about its merits. If we learn that our
conversation partners have political objectives of their own, we
might inform them that if they give us their support on the health
care referendum, we will happily lend our votes to their favorite political program. If we are unscrupulous about means, we might
threaten to unveil a particularly sensitive secret from their past endeavors unless they guarantee us their votes.
However, if our aim is to get our conversation partners to vote
for the referendum because they believe its program for health care
reform is a good idea, we need to adduce arguments that are intrinsically related to its merits, that show why the proposal is a good
idea in and of itself. It is important that those arguments be convincing to our conversationpartners. Whether they are the way that
we ourselves think about the matter is generally irrelevant to the
task of persuasion. If we know that we are talking to utilitarians,
we will attempt to mount an argument for the proposal that stresses
overall improvement to societal health and decreased spending on
health care; if we are talking to liberation theologians, we will point
out how the poor are disproportionately disadvantaged by the cur-
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rent system.
Finally, the third and most ambitious aim of persuasive argument is to convince our conversation partners to hold the same position on a particular question for the same reasons that we do. This
process has two-steps. First, we need to convince our conversation
partners that the reasons we want to deploy are solid. This task
may be rather difficult if those reasons are entirely foreign to them.
Second, we need to convince our conversation partners that the reasons we have put forth in fact support the particular position we
wish to advocate.
We can gain some insight into the mechanics of this process by
drawing upon several insights developed by William Werpehowski
in an article entitled Ad Hoc Apologetics.3 As its title suggests, the
goal of the article is to explain how Christians might go about persuading non-believers to accept fundamental Christian claims about
various aspects of human existence." Werpehowski understands
religious belief not primarily as a private "internal" experience, but
as a communally based cultural-linguistic framework that shapes
the way believers understand and experience the world.34 Consequently, his account of apologetics functions as a general account of
how we go about persuading others to accept fundamental elements
of our own moral world view when they subscribe to a very different
way of understanding the moral universe. 5
Werpehowski observes that the first step in the apologetic process is to establish areas of common ground with our conversation
partners.36 Such areas could include particular beliefs about what
is right or wrong to do in specific situations. Next, we attempt to
show how the broad conceptual framework available to us through
our participation in a community of faith provides a more coherent
and fruitful explanation of the beliefs we have in common than do
any of the alternatives. As Werpehowski notes, the apologetic process is necessarily "cumulative in character;"38 no one adopts a new
moral world view simply because it provides a better account of one
or two commonly recognized dilemmas. Moreover, it is complicated
by the fact that what counts as evidence for a particular framework
of meaning may only be appreciated as such from within that
framework. It is further complicated by the fact that the true test
of a comprehensive framework is a matter of practice, not theory: ul-

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

William Werpehowski, Ad Hoc Apologetics, 66 J. RELIGION 282 (1986).
Id. at 285.
Id. at 300.
Id. at 301.
Id. at 287.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 288.
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timately, the believability of such a framework is demonstrated by
the fruitfulness of life conducted according to its tenets."'
Werpehowski's account does not minimize the challenges involved in the process of convincing others to adopt fundamental
elements of our world view as their own."' He notes, for example,
that "matters concerning how one should live may demand, for the
purposes of assessment, a consistency and tenacity of commitment
that often sees 'counter-evidence' as temptation."2 Yet as difficult
as it is to convince our conversation partners to alter their fundamental moral framework, the challenges posed by the third type of
persuasive argument presently under discussion are significantly
greater. Persuading others to hold a particular position for the very
same reasons that we do requires us not only to convince them to
adopt our moral framework, but also to succeed in a second argumentative step: We need to convince our conversation partners that
this framework yields a particular judgment about a matter of public import (e.g., our hypothetical referendum on health care reform).
These two steps may not be entirely isolated from one another. Persons who realize that adopting a particular world view may commit
them to specific positions about which they have great reservations
may count that fact as a reason to retain their present outlook.
Thus Werpehowski's analysis offers us another reason to reject
Rawls's and Greenawalt's view that distinctively religious arguments should be reserved for controversial issues that are not resolvable on the basis of public reason. He shows that if we hope to
persuade others of our deepest convictions about moral reality, our
first aim must be to show how they offer a coherent account of a
range of important non-controversial beliefs that we hold in common.43
More generally, the foregoing discussion of the inner logic of all
three types of persuasive argumentation also calls into question the
usefulness of using public reason to the exclusion of particular religious or moral frameworks. Since the goal of persuasive argumentation is to convince our conversation partners, the key is to draw
upon the framework that they will find persuasive-whatever that
framework is.
However, this conclusion sharply points us to some of the concerns animating recent scholarly attempts to restrict the use of specifically religious claims in public dialogue. Assume, for example,
that we live in a state where eighty percent of the voting population
is devoutly evangelical. The analysis of argument as persuasion de-

40.
41.
42.
43.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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veloped above suggests that if we want to convince them to vote for
our hypothetical health reform referendum, we should construct an
argument that draws heavily upon Christian scriptures. Furthermore, if our ultimate objective is simply to win the vote, then it is a
pragmatically defensible strategy to ignore the other twenty percent
of the voters in order to focus time and money upon the eighty percent majority. Despite its effectiveness, many of us, I believe, would
find this strategy rather troubling. It may be instructive to reflect
upon the precise nature of our objections. I believe that they are
both procedural and substantive in nature.
First, we are concerned about the process of the argumentative
strategy. It appears that the views of a segment of the community
are simply discounted because they do not accord with the dominant
moral framework. It is doubtful, however, that the remedy for this
problem is for citizen-activists to couch their claims in a hybrid
"public" language that avoids all explicit use of religious concepts. If
the real impetus for the political stance at issue continues to be
rooted in faith, such "translation" efforts may do nothing more than
mask the nature and source of the disagreement. Ideally, the
twenty percent of the population who do not share the beliefs of the
majority should speak up." By asking why they should support the
policy, and articulating how they view the question in their own
terms, members of the minority group will prompt representatives
of the majority to respond to their concerns. The moral obligation
that might take shape here would bind persons discussing matters
of public policy to hear and attempt to respond to the particular, expressed concerns of their fellow citizens, even if their political program would succeed without so doing.
The procedural problem identified in the preceding paragraph
may point to a deeper, substantive problem. Suppose a group of religiously motivated citizens want to enact a state law prohibiting
homosexual parents from getting custody of their children. 5 They
might forthrightly decide to cast their arguments in terms of the religious reasons that actually prompted their action. On the other
hand, if they are more politically astute, they might draw upon
"publicly accessible" reasons to make their case, by asserting that
such custody arrangements might cause uncertain harm to chil-

44. I do not wish to minimize the hostility that such a minority group
might face in making their objections. For reasons outlined in the body of the
text, however, I do not believe that the solution is for everyone to translate their
claims into a "public" moral language. It is the hostility that poses the moral
problem, and that must be combated in a straightforward way.
45. See Sanford Levinson, Abstinence and Exclusion: What Does Liberalism
Demand of the Religiously Oriented (Would Be) Judge?, in RELIGION AND
CoNTEMPoRARY LIBERALISM 81 (Paul J. Wiethman ed., 1997) (discussing an
analogous case involving a state court judge).
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dren's psychosexual development, etc. Would those who object to
the role of religious discourse in the public realm actually be satisfied by the group's shift in moral terminology, or does their difficulty
run deeper? It seems to me that their real objection is not one of
procedure, but one of substantive justice. They ultimately ask
whether it is just for some participants in a pluralist democracy to
rely upon a pattern of reasoning alien to a minority of citizens in
making public policy that is objectionable to that minority.
This substantive objection cannot be satisfied merely by prohibiting citizens from making explicit appeal to religious beliefs in arguing with one another about matters of public policy. It would also
require us to prohibit citizens from using those beliefs in coming to
form their own judgments on such matters. This goal is morally legitimate for those advocating a society whose public life is ordered
around a full-blown liberal political theory. The fact that such a
prohibition would be almost impossible to implement in practice
might make restrictions on the speech appropriate in the public
square an acceptable, less intrusive, fall back option.
However, to the more pragmatic advocates of a liberal society
(our society) that embraces rather than transcends pluralism, such
as Jeffrey Stout, the ideal is far more problematic.! For such revisionists, liberal society is to be valued for the way of life that it provides, not for the conceptual coherence of its foundations.!7 On a
pragmatic liberal interpretation of Rawls's overlapping consensus, it
cannot be justified theoretically-its elements are empirically determined, and may shift from time to time. Consequently, that consensus is unlikely to provide a framework sufficient to support careful and consistent moral reasoning-at least on difficult and
controverted matters. If moral reasoning is to occur, it must take
place within the richer traditions that contribute some, but not all,
of their elements to the overlapping consensus.
In the end, then, we confront the fundamental problem of a
democratic government. What are the limits that we are willing to
place on majority decision-making in order to provide an appropriate
sphere for minorities to live according to their own conceptions of
the good? In a revisionist liberal society, we can no longer avoid
giving a substantive answer to this question by taking refuge in procedural restrictions placed on the decision-making process of the
majority. We must address the question forthrightly.

46. See generally JEFFREY STOUT, ETHICS AFTER BABEL: THE LANGUAGES OF

MoP.ALs 220-42 (1988). He defines "liberal society, pluralistic society" (neutral
senses) as: "Name for the... practices and institutions invented by the North
Atlantic bourgeoisie; any society whose members show considerable diversity in
religious or philosophical outlook and whose institutions tolerate such diversity
by ascribing certain rights to citizens." Id- at 302.
47. Id. at 220-42.
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III. ARGUMENT AS BULWARK
The third and final use of argument that I would like to examine in the essay is what I call "argument as bulwark." Here, argument is used not primarily for self-revelation, or for the persuasion
of others, but for self-protection or self-promotion. It is not difficult
to identify examples of argument as bulwark; it frequently can be
found on Nightline and other television opinion shows that seem to
book the most extreme representatives of contested issues that they
can find. Many of the "great debates" over controversial matters,
familiar to anyone who has spent significant time on college campuses, may also be considered examples of this genre.
The point of argument as bulwark is not to engage others in
conversation about a difficult matter of mutual concern, but to stake
out and assert a protected sphere of thought or action. Speakers
using argument as a bulwark attempt to give heart to the segment
of the audience that already agrees with them, as well as to impress
opponents and the unconvinced with the power of their commitment.
The ultimate aim of such speakers is to be, and to appear to be, "a
force to be reckoned with" by one's opponents.
We saw that the language of public reason may impede rather
than facilitate the goals of argument used for self-disclosure, or argument understood as a persuasive tool. However, the language of
public reason may serve the purposes of argument as bulwark very
well, for several reasons. First, because public reason is not the first
moral language of the participants in the argument, its use does not
expose them to the same level of intellectual and moral vulnerability. If a particular strand of an argument based in public reason
appears to be disintegrating, it can easily be replaced with another
strand. The participants in the argument are not forced to rethink
their substantive position, which remains safely ensconced in their
primary moral framework.
Second and relatedly, persons using the language of public reason (e.g., the language of rights and utility maximization) to discuss
controversial issues quickly reach the point of talking past one another. As Alasdair MacIntyre described so vividly in After Virtue,48
the contemporary abortion debate endlessly pits advocates of the
"right to life" against proponents of the "right to choice." Because of
the superficial similarity of their moral language (both sides invoke
rights talk), each side can convince itself that its position is actually
responsive to the issues raised by the opposition. 9 Activists can
thereby sidestep troublesome questions that would arise if they considered the issue more fully within their own respective frameworks.
More specifically, by responding to an assertion of "choice" with

48. ALASDAIR
49. Id.

MACINTYRE, AFTER ViRTUE

6-21 (1981).
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their imperative of "life," pro-lifers can avoid the hard jurisprudential question of how their judgments about the morality of abortion
should be translated into law in this particular society. Conversely,
by proffering "choice" as the response to "life," pro-choicers can play
down the hard questions of how women should exercise their legally
protected choice, and what measures the government can appropriately take to encourage morally appropriate choices. Thus, the use
of public reason may not encourage conversation among contending
practitioners of argument as bulwark. Instead, it may simply allow
them to avoid confronting the most fundamental challenges to their
own respective positions.
Third, in my view, public reason is often insufficiently coherent
and well-developed to settle controversial issues. For example,
Rawls's two attempts to use public reason to settle controversial political matters have been less than successful. In a footnote purporting to illustrate the application of public reason in PoliticalLiberalism, he simply asserts his belief that "any reasonable balance of
these three values [due respect for human life, ordered reproduction
of political society over time, and the equality of women] will give
women a duly qualified right to decide whether or not to end her
pregnancy during the first trimester."0 To my mind, it is impossible
for anyone with even a passing acquaintance with the vigorous
bioethical, legal, and political debate over all aspects of this issue
over the past thirty years to consider this footnote to be anything
more than an expression of Rawls's own settled perspective on the
matter.5 ' Indeed, in The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, Rawls
minimizes the status of this claim, stating that this footnote did indeed merely express his opinion, and was not intended as an argument about the nature of public reason."2 Nonetheless, in the very
same article, he introduces similarly abbreviated, suggestive, and
controversial remarks about the status of the traditional heterosexual family in public reason, suggesting that "if [the rights and duties
of gay and lesbian persons] are consistent with orderly family life
and the education of children, they are, ceterisparibus, fully admissible. ' As demonstrated by the heated debates over gay marriage
and homosexual rights between Michael Perry and Paul Weithman,
on the one hand, and John Finnis, Robert George, and Gerard

50. RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 2, at 243 & n.32 (emphasis
added).

51. For vigorous arguments that reasonableness does not require Rawls's
position on abortion from a variety of perspectives, see MICHAEL J. PERRY, LOVE
& POWER: THE ROLE OF RELIGION AND MORALITY IN AMERICAN POLITICS, 116-21

(1991) and John Finnis, Public Reason, Abortion, and Cloning, 32 VAL. U. L.
REv. 361, 373-76 (1998).
52. Rawls, supranote 1, at 798 & n.80.
53. Id. at 788, n.60.
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Bradley, on the other, the limitations of public reason are not likely
to resolve this issue any more than abortion. None of these participants see themselves as drawing on distinctively religious claims in
mounting their arguments.'
In some discussions, the inconclusive nature of public reason
may further the purposes of those who use argument as bulwark.
Frequently talking past each other, practitioners of argument as
bulwark often manifest little respect for one another as conversation
partners. Conveniently ignoring their own flaws in this regard, discussants can point to the incivility and unresponsiveness of their
opponents as evidence of the moral worthlessness of the position
they hold. Emphasizing the shrill and unproductive nature of the
discussion, those using argument as bulwark can quickly convince
themselves and their followers that the time for conversation is
past. The next step is to suggest that victory must be pursued by
other means. For some, the preferred route may be nonviolent civil
disobedience. For others, it may be domestic terrorism. Needless to
say, the latter route is unspeakably tragic for all of us.
IV.

CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS: THE THAUMATROPE

In this essay, I have suggested that the academic discussion of
the use of distinctively religious claims (or other distinctive claims
attributable to comprehensive worldviews of other sorts) is marked
by a double unreality. First, it does not pay sufficient attention to
the fact that argument in the public square is purposeful activity,
conducted by particular people in order to achieve particular ends,
which can be grouped under the categories of self-disclosure, persuasion, and bulwark. To accomplish their ends, citizens make their
case over and over again, in different ways, in different terms, and
to different types of people, in the chaos of the marketplace, the
church hall, and the moose lodge. Unfortunately, in my view, much
of the academic discussion of public reason proceeds as if participating in political discussion was more a matter of delivering our
one definitive presentation in a seminar to similarly educated persons with highly similar values in a lecture room in an ivy-covered
stone or brick building. In The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,
John Rawls appears to advocate a conception of political reasongiving that tracks such an approach; he admonishes us to address
"citizens as citizens," and to give the same set of arguments to all

54. Two of Notre Dame Law School's journals have published symposia on
the issue of gay rights including articles by these and other scholars. See generally, Symposium on Sexual Orientation, 9 NoTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB.
POL'Y 1 (1995); Forum: Sexual Morality and the Possibility of "Same Sex Marriage,"42 AM. J. JURIS. 51-158 (1997).
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comers.' But how is this possible in real political discussion, and
why is it necessary, without a prior commitment to a Rawlsian anthropology?
Our fellow citizens are flesh-and-blood human beings, not one or
more ideological constructs. Some are moved by reason, others by
emotion; some are moved by greed, others by altruism, some are
well-educated, others are not. It is them with whom we are called to
forge a political community, not with our own idealized version of
them. If we are to take our fellow citizens seriously as the people
they are, why should we not address the concerns that actually
trouble them, rather than the concerns by which we judge they
should be troubled if they were "reasonable" according to our own
lights?
Moreover, should not we worry at least a little that the demand
to translate our claims into public reason is ultimately and unacceptably elitist? Very few college-educated believers are going to be
able to develop a full-blown reasonable political conception of justice
based in their particular reasonable comprehensive worldviews, as
Rawls requires in his University of Chicago Law Review article.a A
college-educated believer can easily draw upon a familiar assortment of consequentialist, deontological, and critical theoretical tools
to construct an argument in appropriately public terms. However, a
believer equipped with less formal education may find herself less
able to carry out the necessary translation. Her language, the language of her heart, mind, and soul, may be the language of the Hebrew Bible, the New Testament, or the Qur'an. She may not have
attended Harvard, Columbia, Wake Forest, or Notre Dame. She
may not be able to, and may not ever be able to, comply with the
Rawlsian "proviso." Does that mean she is to be silenced in the political debate? I find this prospect to be deeply troubling.
In my view, the general academic discussion of public reason
tends to proceed as if public argument itself were its own end, to be
judged solely on the basis of its intrinsic merits of coherence, completeness, and elegance. It is true that articles in academic peerreviewed journals are judged in this fashion; however, as I learned
the hard way in my first year of legal practice, legal briefs most certainly are not. The purpose of a brief is simply not the same as that
of an academic article; an irate client who has lost a very important
case is not likely to be much comforted by the thought that her lawyer's brief was analytically complete, rhetorically elegant, and completely fair to the position taken by her opponent. Those qualities
are largely irrelevant to a client who has lost her case. I fear that
much the same irrelevance marks many attempts to judge interven-

55. Rawls, supra note 1, at 799-800.
56. Id. at 765-807.
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tions in the public square by criteria that are entirely unrelated to
the goals for which they were formulated-guiding discussion in our
own political community.
Second, just as the academic debate over public reason takes too
little account of the purposeful nature of political argument, I have
also suggested that it takes too little account of the purposes of its
own restrictions. Why is it so important to limit the role of distinctively religious reasons (or reasons based in other comprehensive
worldviews) in the public arena? In my view, Thiemann's norms of
mutual respect and integrity" are a helpful way of specifying both
the purpose and the content of the norm of public accessibility. In
particular, I have argued that it is important to interpret the norm
of public accessibility in ways that advance rather than impede the
norms of respect and integrity. In the debate as a whole, however,
there seems to be a general failure directly to correlate the nature
and scope of the restriction with one's understanding of its purpose.
In the broader debate, there appears to be two general reasons
for restricting the role of distinctively religious claims (or claims
from other comprehensive worldviews) in the discernment and debate about important political matters. 8 The first pertains to fundamental fairness. In the views of some theorists, religious believers who base their own conclusions about matters of public concern
on reasons whose force depends on the existence of a divine being, or
the reliability of certain ways in which that divine being is asserted
to communicate its will to human beings, are being unfair to their
fellow citizens. On this view, it is not unreasonable for persons to
deny the existence of God, and a fortiori, to contest or reject particular methods of discerning God's nature and will for humanity.
For believers to base their decisions about how to order a common
political life on premises that they cannot expect every reasonable
person to share is deeply unjust. Importantly, the theoretical force
of this argument does not depend on the relative number of "believers" and "unbelievers" in a liberal democratic society. 9

57. See generally THIEMANN, supranote 16.
58. See Nicholas Wolterstorff, Why We Should Reject What Liberalism Tells
Us About Speaking and Acting in Public for Religious Reasons, in RELIGION AND
CoNTEMPORARY LiBERALISM 162-81 (Paul J. Weithman ed., 1997).

59. For example, another Great Awakening could convert all but one or two

people in a particular state to the same religious perspective; it would never-

theless be unjust on this view to restrict the freedom of the unconverted (or the
freedom of those who might wish to leave the faith) on the basis of premises
that they do not unreasonably reject. I take Robert Audi to be advancing this
view. Robert Audi, The State, the Church, and the Citizen, in RELIGION AND
CONTEMPORARY LiBERALISM 38-75 (Paul J. Weithman ed., 1997). "As an advo-

cate for laws and public policies, then, and especially those that are coercive,
virtuous citizens will seek grounds of a kind that any rational adult citizen can
endorse as sufficient for the purpose." Id. at 48.
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If one maintains that it is unfair for religious believers to use
their specifically religious premises in the decisions they make as
citizens, which decisions forge the political framework and restrictions under which nonbelievers as well as believers will live, the
fundamental focus of the restriction will be the manner in which believers themselves actually deliberate and formulate their judgment
about such matters. The nature of restrictions on the way that believers frame their arguments in the public square will be a subsidiary question, flowing from and designed to enforce the fundamental
focus of the restriction on thought processes.
What sort of restrictions on public discussion will channel individual discernment in the ways called for by the fairness-based reason for restricting the use of religious premises in political discernment?
On the one hand, most theorists committed to this
justification for the restriction seem to favor limiting the use of religious premises in public discussion. This restriction may be justified by the claim that the primary way we learn to frame our arguments about issues is by listening to others argue about them; if this
is the case, it is undesirable to give believers any new ideas about
how to address matters of the public square in religious terms. In
fact, such theorists might maintain that the best way to insure that
thinking about matters using distinctively religious premises withers and dies is to ensure that talking about them in this fashion is
kept to a minimum.
But this position is not incontrovertible. Against it, one might
also contend that it would be far more troublesome in the long run if
religiously based thought went underground. It is impossible to control or even to identify the way in which citizens reach their own positions on matters; by controlling the conceptual terms of their public discussion, one does not necessarily force those inclined to rely on
distinctively religious premises in their political deliberations to
change the way they think, but merely to become more adept at
translating their position into the language of liberalism. Drawing
on Millian themes, one might maintain that the best way to discourage the reliance on distinctive premises is to encourage their free
and honest expression-as well as the airing of vigorous criticism
regarding the impropriety of giving such premises any force in deliberations about public matters.
The connection between the rationale and the scope for the restriction on the role of distinctively religious (and other comprehensive) claims is not more clearly apparent with respect to its second,
more pragmatic justification.! Some have argued that, while it is

60. I read Kent Greenawalt as justifying the limitations he would place on
the use of religious premises in arguments on political matters in the public
square on these grounds:
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possible for a reasonable person to maintain any one of a number of
different worldviews, there is no way that any particular worldview
can be decisively demonstrated to be rationally superior to the rest.
The shaky epistemological status of distinctively religious premises
renders their use dangerous to civic peace and friendship, at least in
certain social contexts.6 The obvious focus for concern in this context would be on the use of such premises in the public debate; the
invocation of a distinctly religious premise could be viewed as
"fighting words," at least in a society in which there exists vigorous
commitment to religious truth claims, substantial pluralism, and a
number of religions whose truth claims extend to the structure of
political society. Ideally, of course, suspicions of one another would
be further allayed and social stability most assured, if believers
could be induced to practice self-restraint regarding the use of distinctively religious premises in the course of discernment.
Suppose, however, for one reason or another, it is impossible
and unfair to set limits on the use of distinctively religious premises
in discernment, as Greenawalt has argued.62 How helpful to social
peace will it be to restrain discourse in a context in which there are
no (effective) attempts to restrain discernment? Is it not at least
possible that such a course of action will foster a culture of suspicion, in which citizens question whether there is an ulterior motive
that is not publicly accessible that drives an interlocutor's publicly
accessible reflections? Is not it sometimes likely to lead to ad hominem attacks, in which efforts to defend positions in non-religious
terms are dismissed by identifying the religious affiliation of the one
making the effort?
In short, it sometimes appears as if the fundamental premise of
some participants in the "public reason" debate is that the role of
religion in the public square (either with respect to discernment or
Why should it matter if religious premises are shared?... In a very
religious but extremely tolerant society, public airing of particular religious views might work well, but in actuality such discourse promotes a sense of separation between the speaker and those who do not
share his religious convictions and is likely to produce religious and
political divisiveness.
GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS, supra note 3, at 219.
61. More specifically, in a society in which (a) many people have strong
commitments to the truth of their religion that outrun the basis for rationally
demonstrating to outsiders that their religion is superior; (b) there is significant
religious pluralism; and (c) many of the contending religious frameworks have
vigorous views on how political life should be organized; the clash of religious
beliefs can be a dangerous catalyst for social division, instability, and resentment. Conversely, however, on this view, there would be no reason to limit reliance or expression of religious speech in the political realm in a social context
in which either religious belief or its fervor have virtually disappeared, or there
is strong religious homogeneity, or the religions that do predominate take no
stand on matters of political import.
62. GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS, supra note 3, at 219.
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with respect to discourse) must be restricted. The reasons that they
give for that restriction are only loosely related to its nature and
scope. Far more effort is devoted to articulating the restriction on
religion's role in the public square than on developing and defending
in a systematic way the rationale for those restrictions.63 When one
reason for the restriction runs out (e.g., civic respect), the other is
invoked (e.g., civic peace). This oscillation of reasoning is an undeniable (although not uncontroversial) hallmark of creativity and
progress within the common law system. I am not at all sure, however, it should be given the same plaudits within the context of political philosophy.
Let me explain. I teach contracts to first-year law students.
Early in the year we read an excerpt from Benjamin Cardozo's brilliant opinion in Allegheny College v. National Chautauqua County
Bank,' in which he enforces a promise by Mary Yates Johnson to
give $5000 to Allegheny College, which was to be used for divinity
students and kept in a fund named in her honor.? As Leon Lipson
observes in his article about the case, Cardozo oscillates between an
agreement with consideration theory (for which "he had a solid rule
but shaky facts") and a promissory estoppel theory (for which "he
had a shaky rule but (potentially) solid facts").' Lipson argues that
"whenever [Cardozo's] argument emphasizing consideration runs
thin, he moves on to promissory estoppel; whenever his hints in favor of promissory estoppel approach the edge of becoming a committed ground of decision, he veers off in the direction of the doctrine of
consideration."67 He suggests that this type oscillation of argument
creating the effect of mutual reinforcement is similar to
Whatley's simile of "the optical illusion effected by that ingenious and philosophical toy called the Thaumatrope: in which
two objects are painted on opposite sides of a card-for instance, a man and a horse, [or]-a bird and a cage"; the card is
63. In response to the objection that religious divisiveness is not a problem
in the United States, Rawls simply asserts that it "is incorrect and sociologically
faulty. For without citizens' allegiance to public reason and their honoring the
duty of civility, divisions and hostilities between doctrines are bound in time to
assert themselves, should they not already exist." Rawls, supranote 1, at 803.
What is the sociological evidence for this claim? Why does Rawls think that arguing in terms of competing political conceptions of justice generated by competing comprehensive worldviews is likely to be any more conducive to public
peace?
64. Allegheny College v. National Chautauqua County Bank, 246 N.Y. 369
(1927), as excerpted in CHARLEs L. KNAPP ET AL., PROBLEMS IN CoNTRAcT LAW:
CAsEs AND MATERIALs 155-61(4th ed. 1999).

65.
66.
(1977),
67.

Id.
Leon Lipson "The Allegheny College Case," 23 YALE L. REP. NO. 3, at 11
as excerpted in KNAPP, supra note 64, at 163.
Id- at 162.
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fitted into a frame with a handle, and the two objects are, "by a
sort of rapid whirl [of the handle], presented to the mind as
combined in one picture-the man on the horse's back, the bird
in the cage." 68
Lipson writes that Cardozo "twirled the Thaumatrope in order
to give the impression that he had solid facts fitting a solid rule."' 9 I
wonder if, in their attempts to correlate the rationale for restricting
the role of religion in the public square with the scope of the restriction, some advocates of public reason are not twirling their own
Thaumatropes. If so, they might profit from Lipson's final observation about the great Cardozo's efforts in this regard: "Some lawyers
think ,7that
what emerges instead is a picture of a bird on the horse's
0
back.

68. Id. at 162-63.
69. Id. at 163.
70. Id.

